About

Stephen Francis Finlay

Associate Professor of Philosophy

Contact Information
E-mail: finlay@usc.edu
Phone: (213) 821-2219
Office: STO 114A

LINKS
Curriculum Vitae
Research Page
 

Education
B.A. Philosophy, History, Auckland University, New Zealand, 1994
M.A. Philosophy, Auckland University, 1996
Ph.D. Philosophy, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 2001
 

Academic Appointment, Affiliation, and Employment History
Associate Professor, University of Southern California, 2009-  
Assistant Professor, University of Southern California, 2002-2009  
 

Description of Research

Summary Statement of Research Interests
Professor Finlay's research is focused on metaethics and ethics, especially the nature of normativity, practical reasoning, moral psychology, and the semantic and metaphysical foundations of ethics.
 

Publications

Book Chapter
Finlay, S. (2009). Against All Reason? Skepticism about the Instrumental Norm. In Charles Pigden (ed.), Hume, Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave McMillan.
Finlay, S. (2009). Normativity, Necessity and Tense. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
Finlay, S. (2008). Motivation to the Means. pp. 173-191. In David Chan (ed.), Moral Psychology Today: Values, Rational Choice & the Will. Routledge.
Finlay, S. (2007). Too Much Morality. pp. 136-154. In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. Oxford University Press.
Finlay, S. (2007). Responding to Normativity. pp. 220-39. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2. Oxford University Press.
 

Encyclopedia Article
Schroeder, M., Finlay, S. (2008). Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External. Stanford CA: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Finlay, S. (2005). The Emotive Theory of Ethics. MacMillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Ed..
 

Journal Article
Finlay, S. (2009). Recent Work on Normativity. Analysis Reviews. Vol. forthcoming
Finlay, S. (2009). What 'Ought' Probably Means, and Why You Can't Detach It. Synthese. Vol. forthcoming
Finlay, S. (2009). The Obscurity of Internal Reasons. Philosophers' Imprint. Vol. 9 (7), pp. 1-22.
Finlay, S. (2009). Oughts and Ends. Philosophical Studies. Vol. 143 (3), pp. 315-340.
Finlay, S. (2008). The Error in the Error Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 86 (3), pp. 347-369.
Finlay, S. (2007). Four Faces of Moral Realism. Philosophy Compass. Vol. 2 (6), pp. 820-49.
Finlay, S. (2006). The Reasons that Matter. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 84, pp. 1-20.
Finlay, S. (2005). Value and Implicature. Philosophers' Imprint. Vol. 5 (4), pp. 1-20.
Finlay, S. (2004). The Conversational Practicality of Value Judgement. Journal of Ethics. Vol. 8(3), pp. 205-223.
 

Honors and Awards
AJP Best Paper Award, Australasian Association of Philosophy, 2009  
American Council of Learned Societies Fellowship Recipient, Charles A. Ryskamp Research Fellowship, 2008-2009   
USC or School/Dept Award for Teaching, General Education Teaching Award, 2003-2004  
 
 
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