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Breaking News Brief
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| 1. U.S. President Barack Obama recently made his first visit to Seoul. What was most notable about his summer with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak? Woo: : The most notable aspect about the trip was economic, not political or diplomatic. That is, both presidents agreed on the importance of actually finishing the stalled Korea-US FTA (also known as the “KORUS FTA”). As its ratification has been delayed in both countries, it is important to note that both presidents acknowledged the importance of moving the trade deal forward. However, even though President Obama mentioned a time frame for ratification in the US Congress during an interview with the Fox television, neither president was willing to commit to a specific deadline in their official announcement. For the U.S., this is largely because Obama has many other priorities first, and passing the FTA through Congress will take concerted Presidential energy and a commitment of political capital that he simply cannot afford at this point, while he is attempting to pass a major health care reform bill. On the South Korean side, although the Koreans deeply desire to complete the KORUS FTA first, the Korean government has made clear that it is planning to move on to making trade agreements with other countries whether or not the KORUS FTA is signed. To that end, Lee Myung-bak recently signed an FTA with both the Euro area and also India. While the Lee government would prefer to complete the KORUS FTA first, if the U.S. hesitates, Korea will complete its FTA with the Euro area and move on. A second notable result of the summit meeting had to do with the question of automobile trade issues. The U.S. automobile industry has been very opposed to the KORUS FTA, and President Lee said he had the intention to talk about the US concerns on automobile issues. However, South Korean Trade Minister Kim Jong-hoon said it talking about the issue did not mean that there would be renegotiation of the FTA or a revision of the wording of the contract. The two sides seem fairly far apart at this point, so it is very interesting to see how it pans out. My own guess is that the actual KORUS FTA will not be renegotiated, but there may be some informal agreements that manage to adjust the auto issue slightly. 2. Has the election of President Lee in South Korea, and Obama in the U.S., led to a situation in which the US and ROK now view the North Korean issue the same way? Woo:Most Korean news media reported that both presidents agreed to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue through a comprehensive “grand bargain.” The grand bargain is an approach put forth by President Lee that would involve a comprehensive rewards package for North Korea if it abandons its nuclear program that would involve economic and cultural relations in addition to diplomatic relations. However, I should point out that President Obama did not use the term, “grand bargain,” while President Lee mentioned that term three times during the two presidents’ concluding press conference. President Obama mentioned a “definitive and comprehensive resolution,” or a “common approach.” As we know that all the words are well crafted during presidential speech, it seems somewhat significant that might be a reason why President Obama avoided using the term “grand bargain.” Thus, although both presidents agree on the general principles towards dealing with North Korea – a willingness to negotiate backed up by a firm plan for economic sanctions – the actual details of the two countries may differ. We will find out much more about the U.S. approach to North Korea in a few weeks, after U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth visits Pyongyang in December. 3. What do you think President Lee wanted to achieve from this summit? Woo:President Lee might hope for three things domestically. First, he needed to persuade domestic audiences as well as the US government to agree his approach to the North Korea. At the same time, he wanted to send a message to North Korea that they cannot simply bypass the South and have a direct talks with the U.S. South Korea is always in a delicate position with respect to North Korea – South Korea is the country with the most direct contact and importance for North Korea, yet the U.S. is clearly the most important country for North Korea. Lee also wanted to show his domestic South Korean audience that he had also sincerely pursued the "grand bargain" approach in his North Korea policy. Second, on economic matters, Lee was aiming for results that would resonate with the service and agricultural sectors in South Korea. Lee most likely was hoping to show these important sectors that the South Korean economy will not be harmed by perhaps making a slight concession to the US on automobiles trade. Finally, Lee is hoping to regain his stature as a national leader with international stature. This autumn has seen a set of domestic political setbacks for Lee, with his party’s defeat in important electoral districts in October, and a struggle over the Sejong City issue. These setbacks caused Lee to lose momentum in pursuing his own domestic and foreign policy agendas. After the summit with the US president, I think that he is going to spin out how successful it is his talk with the US president. 4. Why has the US-ROK relationship improved so much under Presidents Lee and Obama? A few years ago, South Korean-US relations were deeply troubled, and Japan was considered the U.S.’ most reliable ally in the region. Yet today that situation is reversed. Woo:This is ironic, isn’t it? I would point to domestic politics in both Japan and Korea. In Japan, Hatoyama’s DPJ won on domestic issues such as the economy or responding to the needs of local Dietmembers from Okinawa; and he is pursuing those goals, which led to some friction with the U.S. In South Korea, Lee’s domestic political base is more conservative, and wants closer relations with the U.S. So for the time being, Korea is closer to the U.S. than Japan. But this can change depending on domestic politics as much as on international relations. Jung-Yeop Woo is Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Southern California's Korean Studies Institute. He is an expert on Korean politics and elections. |
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Breaking News Brief
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| 1. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Pyongyang this week to celebrate the 60th anniversary of PRC-DPRK diplomatic relations North Korea, and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il made a pledge to return to multiparty talks Is this likely to happen? David C. Kang: Unfortunately, while the prospect for multilateral negotiations is a welcome development, it is also likely to be a long time before any serious negotiations begin. While even opening the nuclear negotiations would be a positive step, it also appears that there is very little potential for actual movement in the negotiations at this time. All summer long the North has been hinting that it might be willing to come back to the table precisely because it has proven to the world that it has a nuclear capability. Kim Jong-il’s announcement contained many preconditions and left unanswered many questions, and it is quite likely that this latest statement is little more than an opening ploy in what will be a long and protracted set of "negotiations about negotiations." 2. What does Wen’s visit to North Korea tell us about PRC-DPRK relations? Kang:Most significantly, the visit and the effusive rhetoric from both leaders is ample evidence that China has no intention of abandoning North Korea, or putting sizable pressure on the North to modify its ways. China has long been the most reliable ally for Kim Jong-il and the North Korean state, and it is Chinese economic and political relations that serve as a lifeline to the regime in Pyongyang. Many observers over the past year have speculated that the Chinese were growing increasingly frustrated with Kim Jong-il and his aggressive actions, and speculated that the Chinese were likely to begin rethinking their support of Kim. Chinese scholars and policymakers have indeed voiced increasing unhappiness with Kim’s policies. However, Wen’s visit revealed that it is probably premature to speculate that China is so upset with North Korea that it will reverse its policy toward North Korea. It is premature not because of any genuine affection between the two countries, but rather because of China’s own national interest. China continues to see North Korean collapse and the possible disruption of its borders through refugee flows as a greater threat than North Korean militancy; and while China desires denuclearization in the region and that North Korea would follow the Chinese model of economic reform, it is still pursuing those goals quietly and without exerting ample pressure on North Korea. Until Chinese priorities shift, it is unlikely to take any serious coercive measures toward North Korea. Indeed, the support that Wen brought with him was sizable: up to US$200 million worth of economic assistance, support in the fields of education and technology, and most visibly, Chinese funds to build a new bridge over the Yalu River. At the same time, the Chinese have consistently urged North Korea to reform their economy along Chinese lines, but as the North Korean leadership has only chosen to experiment with economic reforms, and has not fully embraced a "Chinese-style" of political and economic rule. 3. Were the sanctions imposed under UN resolution 1874 part of the reason Kim is willing to return to negotiations? Kang:Some observers have suggested that Kim’s willingness to talk now is a result of the pain of the economic sanctions imposed on North Korea by UN resolution 1874. Those UN sanctions came about in response to the North’s nuclear and missile tests earlier this year, and have targeted North Korean exports, proliferation of military technology, and luxury goods. Yet we should be cautious about concluding that sanctions have worked to bring North Korea back to the table. The North Korean leadership has endured far worse economic isolation from the world in the past, and the regime is clearly prepared to endure sanctions today. Furthermore, my own belief is that North Korea hopes to use the bilateral talks precisely to remove the sanctions. That is, North Korea has claimed that removal of the sanctions must precede any realistic discussion of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, and Kim’s willingness to talk is most likely really a way of saying that "if sanctions are removed" the North is willing to talk. This also is exactly the opposite of what the U.S., South Korea, and Japan expect: their policy is that after North Korea denuclearizes, the sanctions will be removed. Thus, once again we are in a position with North Korea where both sides may agree on the ultimate goals, and both sides may even agree on the solution to those goals. But once again, the key question will be "who goes first?" 4. What is the likelihood that the U.S. will negotiate bilaterally with North Korea? Will this leave South Korea on the outside once again? Kang:The key part of Kim Jong-il’s announcement was his explicit condition that bilateral talks with the U.S. must precede any multilateral negotiations. This is something the U.S. is highly unlikely to agree to do; in fact, the Obama administration has long claimed that bilateral negotiations will only occur in the context of multilateral negotiations, and that the U.S. will not abandon its own allies (South Korea and Japan). The explicit Obama administration policy towards North Korea is a preference for dialogue and negotiation; but the Obama administration just as explicitly has pledged to work closely with its allies, as well as to “break the cycle” of North Korea provocation and negotiation. The Obama administration has been consistent in its application of those principles, and it is unlikely to change them now. David C. Kang is Professor of International Relations and Business, and Director of the Korean Studies Institute, at the University of Southern California. He is author of China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia; and co-author of Nuclear North Korea. |
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Breaking News Brief
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| 1. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won enough seats in Japan's legislative election today to form the next government without the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that has governed Japan for all but 11 months of the last 54 years. What are the general implications of this change in power? Easley:The election results are testament to the Japanese public's frustration. The LDP was instrumental in realizing Japan's economic miracle and postwar security, but since the burst of Japan's economic bubble and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the LDP has struggled to adjust. The Japanese public has been dissatisfied with the pace of progress on various domestic issues, including economic growth and inequality, bureaucratic mismanagement, and coping with Japan's aging society. If the DPJ is able to effectively deal with Japan's domestic challenges, this can strengthen Japan economically and as a security partner, and that would be good news for Washington and Seoul. The trouble is that nearly all the governing experience in Japan and most of the personal relations with diplomats and officials of other countries is held by the LDP. This will put the new DPJ government under enormous pressure to make a good first impression with its Japanese voters, as well as with Japan's international partners. 2. Japan's relations with South Korea and China have often been plagued by issues of history and memories of war. How will the DPJ handle these historical sensitivities? Easley:The DPJ has long advocated that Japan seriously reflect on its history and show greater sensitivity to its neighbors' memories of the past. Toward this end, the DPJ may take a more conciliatory position on the content of history textbooks. Regarding Yasukuni Shrine, DPJ President Yukio Hatoyama has pledged not to visit the shrine and that as prime minister he will see that no members of his cabinet go either. The DPJ may pursue the construction of a secular war memorial for Japanese officials to visit instead of Yasukuni. Such gestures would almost certainly be appreciated by the Korean people and other Asian populations. On the other hand, the DPJ does not sound flexible on Japan's maritime and territorial disputes with its neighbors, promising to remain firm on Japan's claims. Hatoyama has said that these issues [such as the Dokdo/Takeshima island dispute between Tokyo and Seoul] are difficult to resolve bilaterally because if one side is seen as giving concessions, a nationalist backlash would follow. So Hatoyama suggests that these disputes be resolved in the process of developing an "East Asian Community," along a path of regional integration similar to that traversed by the European Union. This sounds good in principle, but will prove very difficult in practice. Nonetheless, it is important to have big cooperative visions to help nations gradually overcome historical issues. In the short-term, a more realistic but still worthy goal for politicians and diplomats will be not allowing historical issues to derail relations or delay urgently needed cooperation on financial stability, human security and the environment. 3. What about the implications of the election for Japan's policy toward North Korea? Easley:Hatoyama has mentioned the possibility of restarting talks with North Korea. Much will depend on how the DPJ handles the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea decades ago. [Several abductees were returned to Japan; some are reported dead, others are still considered missing. The issue has complicated not only Japan's diplomacy with North Korea, but also Tokyo's ability to coordinate policy in the Six-party Talks]. The DPJ may want to focus on North Korea's nuclear program, missiles and potential political-economic instability, but can not appear soft on the abductions issue because of Japanese public opinion and the possibility that the LDP opposition might use the issue against the DPJ. The interaction between Tokyo and Seoul will also be key. The new DPJ government will need to closely coordinate with Seoul on North Korea, but it is also important for Seoul to reassure Tokyo. Japan in particular has legitimate concerns about North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. If South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's administration shows understanding of Tokyo's security concerns, this would facilitate U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral coordination, which in turn could encourage China to be increasingly helpful in pressing for North Korea's cooperation. 4. What does the advent of a DPJ government mean for the Obama administration's Korea policy? Easley:President Obama's team and relevant officials at the State Department are well aware of the complicated strategic geometry in dealing with North Korea. They know pushing too hard could spark a military conflict with North Korea or serious break with China [since Beijing wishes to avoid the collateral effects of a collapse of the North Korean regime]. On the other hand, the Obama administration recognizes that taking a soft line at this point would present credibility problems for U.S. alliances and the international nonproliferation regime and undo progress made to date in having the world hold North Korea accountable for its provocative actions. United Nations sanctions are a counter-proliferation device and punish North Korea's breech of its international commitments. In principle, the sanctions should not be eased just because North Korea is willing to talk. It is important to reengage North Korea diplomatically given the opportunity, but President Obama and President Lee said the pattern where North Korea raises tensions and then returns to talks seeking rewards must be broken. The new government in Tokyo will likely agree. The question now is whether Washington, Tokyo and Seoul, working together with Beijing, will stay on the same page to hold North Korea to account – demanding concrete actions from Pyongyang on disarmament in exchange for concrete improvements in economic and diplomatic relations. Leif-Eric Easley is a Ph.D candidate at Harvard University's Department of Government, a Kelly Fellow with the Pacific Forum CSIS, and a Visiting Scholar at the University of Southern California's Korean Studies Institute. He recently co-authored a paper in the journal. Asia Policy examining the foreign policy visions of the Democratic Party of Japan. |
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Breaking News Brief
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| 1. Former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung died today at a hospital in Seoul, reportedly of heart failure and complications from pneumonia. He was 85 and remained engaged in politics until his death. How will he be remembered? Leif-Eric Easley:Kim Dae-jung's administration helped stabilize the South Korean economy after the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s. But he will be remembered most for contributions to South Korean democratization and for the "Sunshine Policy" which sought political reconciliation and economic integration with North Korea. It was for these efforts that Kim won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000. His legacy was subsequently tarnished however, by revelations of political corruption involving his family and evidence that the landmark inter- Korean summit may have been "bought" via secret payments to Pyongyang. Kim's strategy of engaging North Korea, which was continued by his successor Roh Moo-hyun, was dealt a serious blow when North Korea tested a nuclear device in 2006 and over the years reneged on most agreements it made with Seoul. Nonetheless, former president Kim's efforts for democracy and North-South reconciliation have lasting effects and are a significant legacy. 2. What does former president's Kim life say about South Korean politics? Easley:A tremendous amount – the arc of Kim Dae-jung's life is closely tied to that of South Korean politics for the last five decades. It would be a gross over-simplification to only remember Kim Dae-jung as South Korea's president from 1998 to 2003. In the 1960s, Kim Dae- jung emerged on the national stage as President Park Chung-hee's archrival. The divide between these two men reflected and helped define the left-right divide in South Korean politics that persists to this day. Park was of the military and the South Korean elite; Kim was a product of and voice for the masses. Kim Dae-jung was a leading critic of Park Chung-hee's legitimacy (Park came to power in a military coup). Park jailed Kim as a political dissident and may have had him killed if not for U.S. intervention. Kim came from South Korea's southwest region, which has a strong rivalry with the southeast region, home to Park and other presidents. To their respective followers, Park embodied South Korea's rapid economic development while Kim embodied South Korea's democratization. Park was deeply suspicious of North Korea and wanted a strong South Korean military and economy to employ against it; Kim wanted to politically embrace North Korea and integrate the two economies as a step toward ultimately reunifying the Korean Peninsula. 3. Mr. Kim's funeral will actually be the second this year for a South Korean leader? Easley:Yes, and the death of a former president is a significant event in South Korea. The passing of former presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Dae-jung this year will likely mark 2009 as the end of a political era for many South Koreans. But while former President Kim Dae-jung will long be a controversial figure in South Korean history, his death of natural causes at age 85 is much less controversial than former President Roh Moo-hyun's suicide three months ago. Former President Roh was the immediate predecessor of the current president, Lee Myung-bak, and was under investigation for corruption charges. Roh's untimely death prompted a public outpouring of sympathy for him and criticism for the current government and its policies. Former President Kim Dae-jung's passing will certainly prompt a period of national mourning, but does not come as such a shock to the Korean public as did former president Roh's suicide. 4. What implications might D.J. Kim's passing have for North-South Korean relations? Easley:Perhaps as former President Clinton's visit to Pyongyang provided 'face' for North Korea to adjust its tone toward the United States, public reflection of Kim Dae-jung's life may help provide the political packaging for a new South Korean attempt to talk with the North. While it is not realistic to expect a generous memorial for Kim to forge a grand compromise between South Korean conservatives and progressives on policy toward North Korea, Kim's passing may provide symbolic impetus for some form of reengagement with Pyongyang. Since coming to office last year, the current South Korean president has been rebuffed by Pyongyang as hawkish and disingenuous. But President Lee Myung-bak is making a renewed effort to engage North Korea based on reciprocity, offering humanitarian aid and economic assistance if both sides reduce conventional military deployments along their shared border and if North Korea recommits to dismantling its nuclear weapons program. 5. Is there any sign that North Korea will respond in a constructive manner? Easley:North Korea has sent condolences to the South and may ask to send a delegation to former president Kim Dae-jung's funeral. Pyongyang recently received a visit by Hyun Jeong- eun, the chairwoman of Hyundai Group, and released a Hyundai employee held for months on charges that he made inappropriate political statements while in North Korea. There is talk of restarting South Korean tourism to the Mt. Kumgang resort in North Korea and resuming inter- Korean family reunions. However, United Nations mandated sanctions on North Korea's nuclear and missile programs remain in place and are still only in the process of being implemented. Ultimately, you should expect Pyongyang to act according to its interpretation of its own interests. The regime of Kim Jong-il appears focused on securing a stable internal political succession and externally promoting North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. The coming months will be an important period for international efforts aimed at persuading North Korea that its open economic development and complete nuclear disarmament are in everyone's interests. Leif-Eric Easley is a Ph.D. candidate at Harvard University's Department of Government, a Kelly Fellow with the Pacific Forum CSIS, and a Visiting Scholar at the University of Southern California's Korean Studies Institute. |
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Breaking News Brief
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| 1. The main purpose of this visit is to secure the release of the two American journalists. Is there another agenda in Clinton’s visit? David C. Kang:Both the US and North Korea have kept the issue of the two journalists quite separate from their other diplomatic and political problems; and Clinton's visit is aimed solely at getting the two journalists released. North Korea charged the journalists with “illegal entry,” and did not charge the journalists with espionage or politicize their arrests in a way that links them to the nuclear crisis. The U.S. as well has not attempted to link the two issues. Former president Clinton is also not an official representative of the United State government; as such, he may have been able to convey a broad message about the US government’s desire to negotiate with North Korea; but he would not have been in a position to discuss anything specific. 2. What does North Korea gain in releasing the journalists? Kang:North Korea’s main purpose in arresting, sentencing, and now releasing the journalists to a major U.S. political figure has been to be treated as a sovereign nation with its own laws and territory. North Korea’s actions from the beginning of this incident have displayed a heightened desire for recognition of its status as a nation-state like any other. Thus arresting the two journalists for “illegal entry” was a statement that its borders are sovereign and must be respected; putting them through the judicial process (however maligned) was a performance that emphasized that North Korea also has laws and processes. Perhaps most importantly, releasing them after the process has run its course is a way of gaining status by having a major U.S. political figure come to North Korea. 3. What do you think it means that Kim Jong-il himself met with Clinton? Kang:This is part of North Korea’s desire for status as a nation-state. Kim Jong-il meeting Clinton can be portrayed as “two national leaders” meeting; something for which North Korean has a deep desire. There is also the possibility that Clinton’s visit could set the atmosphere for further talks between North Korea and the United States, but that remains to be seen. 4. Some people say that North Korea's actions demonstrate that its leadership prefers bilateral talks to the six-party talks. Do you agree with this view? Kang:On the whole I think this is an accurate assessment. North Korea sees its main problem as its relationship with the United States, and thus prefers to deal only with the U.S. In contrast, the U.S. sees the problem as regional and intimately involving South Korea, China, and Japan, and thus prefers to negotiate in multilateral terms. The U.S. has said, however, that it is open to occasional bilateral meetings with North Korea as long as they are part of a larger multilateral process. 5. The White House has distanced itself from Clinton's visit saying that it is private. What do you think about this? Kang:The basic reason is that this is an humanitarian effort on behalf of the two journalists, and former U.S. president Bill Clinton is not an official representative of the US. Therefore, the US government has made clear that he is going in his capacity as a private citizen. This is both to protect the U.S. government in case anything unexpected happens, but also to separate the nuclear issue and the two journalists. This means that at most Clinton can speak to North Korean officials about diplomatic or political problems (such as the nuclear crisis) in general terms, but he will not have anything specific to say to Kim; that is reserved for actual U.S. government officials. David C. Kang is Professor of International Relations and Business, and Director of the Korean Studies Institute, at the University of Southern California. He is author of China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia; and co-author of Nuclear North Korea. |
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